### Appendix A: Proposals Related to Trade, Hydrocarbons and/or Varosha/Maraş

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Proposed by</th>
<th>Contents of Proposal</th>
<th>Implemented?</th>
<th>Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 1978</td>
<td>Presented by the U.S.; co-authored by the UK and Canada.¹</td>
<td>Start negotiations for a loose federation and resettle Varosha/Maraş with its rightful owners, in stages and under UN auspices, while negotiations continue. Greek Cypriots who return to remain independently of whether the two sides reach a final agreement.</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>The Greek Cypriot side rejected the proposal, calling it &quot;imperialist&quot; and saying it interfered in Cyprus' internal affairs.²</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 1979</td>
<td>Kyprianou-Denktash Agreement³</td>
<td>Resettle Varosha/Maraş with its rightful owners, under UN auspices, upon initiation of negotiations aimed at a comprehensive solution. To be implemented independently of the negotiations' outcome on other issues.</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Both sides initially assented but later withdrew from the agreement.</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 1981</td>
<td>Turkish Cypriot side</td>
<td>Draft constitution would create a bicomunal, bizonal federal republic with equal representation; freedom of movement and settlement; and the right to property to be regulated in accordance with guidelines the sides agreed to in 1977. Proposal also includes a map that delineates the Varosha/Maraş area and provides for the opening of Nicosia/Lefkoşa airport to international traffic with both sides enjoying free access.⁴</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>The proposal was discussed until 1983, but no agreement was reached. The Greek Cypriots insisted on the indivisibility of territory and a Greek Cypriot-dominated legislature, which Turkish Cypriots rejected.⁵</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1992-July 1993</td>
<td>UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali</td>
<td>Rehabilitate Varosha/Maraş and reopen Nicosia/Lefkoşa airport under UN supervision – allowing both sides free access.⁶</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Agreed in principle by both sides. Disagreement over how to implement precluded doing so.</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 1994</td>
<td>UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali (Building on 1993 proposal)</td>
<td>Rehabilitate Varosha/Maraş and reopen Nicosia/Lefkoşa airport under UN supervision – allowing both sides free access. Appoint a head of a UN Temporary Administration of Varosha/Maraş’s fenced-off area, empowered to collect local taxes and customs duties; free entry for both sides to Varosha/Maraş, &quot;subject to the requirements of normal security&quot;. Appoint a UN airport administrator with full authority to regulate traffic rights.</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Rejected by the Turkish Cypriot side, which said this approach unacceptably revised what was agreed to in 1993 with regard to a) the schedule for implementation; b) traffic rights at the airport; c) collection of customs duties by the UN; d) arrangements for secure travel between the buffer zone and the fenced-off area of Varosha/Maraş; and e) the map delineating Varosha/Maraş.⁷</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Turkish Cypriot side</td>
<td>Fourteen-point proposal seeking completion of the aforementioned UN-sponsored confidence-building measures and expressing the Turkish Cypriot side’s readiness to discuss the subject of RoC membership in the EU.⁸</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Rejected by the Greek Cypriot side. President Glafcos Clerides opposed making settlement a prerequisite for EU membership. He argued that Turkish Cypriot support for the EU application could help find common ground.⁹</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### April 2003

**Turkish Cypriot side**

- Lift all restrictions on transport and travel across Cyprus’s divide; hand over part of the fenced-off area of Varosha/Maraş (areas south of Dhimokratias street, extending to the UN Buffer Zone) to Greek Cypriot control for resettlement; lift restrictions on overseas trade, transport, travel, cultural activities and sport; lift corresponding restrictions imposed by Türkiye and Greece; normalise flow of goods between the two sides; form a bilateral Reconciliation Committee to “promote understanding, tolerance and mutual respect between the two parties”.

   **Partially.**
   
   Some checkpoints opened, but the Greek Cypriot side refused further negotiations on confidence-building measures, seeking negotiations for a comprehensive settlement under the UN’s aegis instead.

### July 2004

**Greek Cypriot side**

- Start demining on both sides; hand over Varosha/Maraş to its lawful inhabitants, per UN Security Council Resolution 550 (1984); organise common operation of Famagusta/Gazimağusa port; restrict military exercises; open eight additional crossing points.

   **Partially.**
   
   UN-coordinated demining began. Some checkpoints opened, but no action on other points.
   
   In a letter dated August 2004, President Rauf Denktaş blamed the Greek Cypriot side for “holding Turkish Cypriot economic development hostage to its political considerations” and “extending its illegal authority over the Turkish Cypriots.”

### 2005-2006

**EU initiative, under the auspices of the Austrian and Finnish EU presidencies**

- Proposals to de-isolate Turkish Cypriots, including the Green Line regulation (an EU framework dealing with the movement of persons and goods across the boundary separating Turkish and Greek Cypriots), financial aid to Turkish Cypriots and direct trade between Turkish Cypriots and the EU.

   A draft European Commission declaration in December 2005 echoed Greek Cypriots’ demands that Varosha/Maraş be returned to them, along with joint operation of the port at Famagusta/Gazimağusa and a moratorium on sale of or construction on Greek Cypriot property in the north.

   **Partially.**
   
   Green Line and aid proposals implemented.
   
   The direct trade regulation proposal submitted to the European Commission was denied a vote on the grounds that voting would imply tacit recognition of the north.
   
   Turkish Cypriots initially agreed to return Varosha/Maraş in return for opening ports and airports in the north.
   
   Greek Cypriots rejected opening northern ports and airports, saying it would lead to development of separate economies and permanent division of Cyprus.

   No other action taken.

### January 2006

**Türkiye**

- The plan’s ten items contain the following related to trade and movement:
  - open Türkiye’s seaports to Greek Cypriot vessels involved in trade, in accordance with the European-Turkish customs union; allow Greek Cypriot air carriers to use Turkish airspace for overflights and to land at Turkish airports in accordance with international procedures;
  - open the ports in northern Cyprus, including Famagusta/Gazimağusa, Kyrenia/Girne and Karavostasi/Gemikonaği, to international traffic of goods, persons and services under Turkish Cypriot management;
  - open Tymbou/Ercan airport for direct flights

   **No.**
   
   The Greek Cypriot side rejected the proposal, saying the concessions offered by Türkiye were pre-existing obligations vis-à-vis the EU.
under Turkish Cypriot management; make special arrangements for the practical inclusion, as an economic entity, of northern Cyprus into the EU’s customs union, allowing unhindered direct trade between both sides of the island and with the outside world; allow Turkish Cypriot participation in international sports, cultural and other social activities.

**December 2006** Türkiye

Open one port in Türkiye to RoC vessels and one airport in Türkiye to RoC commercial flights; open the Tymbou/Ercan airport and the Famagusta/Gazimağusa port to international trade under “TRNC” management.²¹

No. RoÇ presidential spokesman Vassilis Palmas said in a radio interview the “Turkish demand for the opening of Tymbou (Ercan) Airport was a ‘red line’ for the Cyprus government”.²²

**September 2011** Turkish Cypriot side

Either jointly cease all hydrocarbon exploration activity until an agreement is reached or establish a joint ad hoc committee with UN participation responsible for giving licences for drills.²³

No. Greek Cypriots rejected proposal on grounds that hydrocarbon exploration is a sovereign right of the RoC.²⁴

**September 2012** Turkish Cypriot side

Establish a technical committee, which will be chaired by an independent facilitator appointed by the UN secretary-general. The committee would help the two sides reach an agreement on licences issued, conclude delimitation agreements, agree on how to share gas revenue and govern the revenue account. The revenues would be used to finance implementation of a comprehensive settlement.²⁵

No. The Greek Cypriots rejected the offer.

**June 2013** Greek Cypriot side, proffered as a public statement by the RoÇ’s foreign minister and never formalised.

Subject to the Turkish Cypriot side handing Varosha/Maraş to its Greek Cypriot lawful owners: RoÇ would enable Turkish Cypriots direct trade with EU tax-free via Famagusta/Gazimağusa port, to be operated by Turkish Cypriots under EU supervision.²⁶

No.

**May 2015** Greek Cypriot side²⁷

Put in place mobile interoperability; open more crossing points; connect electricity grids; prevent radio frequency interference.

Yes. All proposals implemented. Mobile interoperability achieved in 2019.²⁸ Additional crossing opened.²⁹ Electricity grid connected.³⁰

**February 2019** Greek Cypriot side³¹

Among the plan’s 21 measures, the following are related to trade, connectivity and Varosha/Maraş: Allow use of Famagusta/ Gazimağusa port under UN control, subject to Varosha/Maraş being handed to its lawful inhabitants; unfreeze negotiating chapters in Türkiye’s EU accession process, subject to Türkiye fully implementing the Ankara Protocol; conduct demining on both sides; open additional

No. The sides did agree to demine nine suspected hazardous areas on both sides of the island.³²
crossing points; lift other obstacles to trade in order to facilitate movement of commercial vehicles transporting goods covered by the EU Green Line regulation, eliminate Turkish Cypriot import taxes, permits and VAT on Greek Cypriot goods.

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Side</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Response</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 2019</td>
<td>Turkish Cypriot side</td>
<td>Create a joint committee to cooperate in decision-making about offshore energy reserves.</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2019</td>
<td>Greek Cypriot side</td>
<td>Provide regular briefings to the Turkish Cypriot leadership on hydrocarbon issues, on the condition that activity in the RoC’s claimed EEZ cease; set up an escrow account, in accordance with the respective population counts of future constituent states (the two sides of the prospective federation) to share revenues with Turkish Cypriots, on the condition that Türkiye agrees to delimit its EEZ with the RoC in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS).</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2020</td>
<td>Greek Cypriot side</td>
<td>Subject to EEZ delimitation between the RoC and Türkiye, in accordance with UNCLOS: return Varosha/Maraş to its rightful owners under UN administration, per UN Security Council Resolutions 550 and 789; place Tymbou/Ercan airport under UN administration to allow international flights; place Famagusta/Gazimağusa port under EU administration, subject to Türkiye lifting its restrictions on Cyprus and fully implementing the EU-Türkiye Association Agreement by opening up its ports and airspace to Cyprus; create an escrow account, for the benefit of the Turkish Cypriots, where revenues from hydrocarbon exploration would be deposited prior to a solution to the Cyprus problem in accordance with the respective population counts of the two future constituent states.</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2021</td>
<td>Greek Cypriot side</td>
<td>Same substance as the December 2020 proposal: discussing Varosha/Maraş, Tymbou/Ercan airport and Famagusta/Gazimağusa port, as well as the Cyprus problem in general.</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2022</td>
<td>Greek Cypriot side</td>
<td>Open Tymbou/Ercan airport to direct flights under UN auspices; operate Famagusta/Gazimağusa port customs services under EU authority; hand over</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Varosha/Maraş to UN administration; Türkiye to implement the EU’s Additional Ankara Protocol by opening ports to ships under the RoC flag and allowing RoC planes to enter its airspace; set up an escrow account to share revenues with the Turkish Cypriots, on the condition that Türkiye agrees to delineate an EEZ with the RoC in accordance with UNCLOS.

Greek Cypriot side to the whole island”, adding that new negotiations can begin only after their sovereign equality is recognised.42

July 2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Turkish Cypriot side</th>
<th>Cooperation in six concrete areas, without prejudice to the two sides’ respective stances regarding a comprehensive settlement.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Demining of the entire island</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Joint work under UN auspices to curb irregular migration</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Hydrocarbons committee</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Joint committee on solar energy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Connecting the electricity grid to Turkey</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Joint committee on water resources</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

No. President Nicos Anastasiades said it constitutes a new attempt at a two-state solution.43

4 Necatigil, The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law, op. cit., pp. 164-167.
6 As per “Report of the Secretary General on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus”, UNSC S/26026, 1 July 1993, “a significant area of Varosha would be placed under UN administration as a special area for bicommmunal trade and contact”. To this end, the Turkish Cypriot side requested that Tymbou/Ercan airport be allowed to receive European flights and the opening of ports in the north which had hitherto been registered as “closed” by the RoC authorities, preventing the free entry of international vessels, ie, lifting what the Turkish Cypriots deemed an “embargo”.
10 “Letter sent to Greek Cypriot Leader Papadopulos on 2 April 2003 by the President of the TRNC, H.E. Rauf R. Denktaş”, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 April 2003.
11 On 23 April 2003, a first crossing opened at the Ledra Palace Hotel in the capital, Nicosia/Lefkoşa. The second crossing, for vehicles only, opened at Ayios Dometios/Metehan a month later. The Ledra/Lokmacı pedestrian crossing, the capital’s second, opened on 3 April 2008 in the heart of the city. The Strovilia/Akyar crossing in Famagusta/Gazimağusa opened on 26 April 2003, the Astromeritis/Bostancı crossing on 31 August 2005 and the Limnitis/Yeşilirmak crossing on 14 October 2010. Two more crossing points were opened up on 11 November 2018. See “First border crossing opened 16 years ago”, LGC News, 26 April 2019. There are nine crossing points (two under the jurisdiction of the British military bases) as of July 2022. “The Situation in Cyprus”, 835th Meeting of the Minister’s Deputies, Council of Europe, 8 April 2003.
13 The two communities agreed to demine their respective areas. Between 2004 and 2011, the Mine Action Center cleared 27,000 mines from the buffer zone. Then, in 2015, the UN deployed a team of demi-
ners to spend six months working in Cyprus. The UN withdrew the team in November 2017, following the breakdown of UN-facilitated settlement talks that July.

16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
21 “New Recommendation from Türkiye to EU – Compilation”, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate for EU Affairs, 12 August 2006 (Turkish).
22 “Cyprus to reject Turkish ‘minimal’ move to open ports”, Financial Mirror, 6 December 2006.
23 “Erğulu proposal over Cyprus gas”, Kathimerini, 25 September 2011.
26 “Meeting of the Minister of Foreign Affairs with the Secretary-General of the United Nations”, press release, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Cyprus at the United Nations, 8 May 2013 (Greek).
27 Statement delivered by Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on Cyprus Espen Barth Eide on behalf of the Greek Cypriot leader Mr. Nicos Anastasiades and the Turkish Cypriot leader Mr. Mustafa Akinci”, 28 May 2015.
28 “Mobile interoperability was no easy task, CCCI official tells CNA”, In Cyprus, 12 July 2019.
30 “Anastasiades, Akinci agree on CBMs including mobile phone network link”, In Cyprus, 26 February 2019.
31 Non-paper on package proposal, on file with Crisis Group.
33 “Akinci: ‘Cooperating in the field of hydrocarbons within the framework of a joint committee will not prevent a solution, and to the contrary will shorten the path to one’”, KKTC Enformasyon Dairesi, 17 July 2019 (Turkish).
34 “Anastasiades proposes creation of escrow account in a bid to ease tension”, Kathimerini, 4 September 2019. In 2022, Anastasiades told Crisis Group that hydrocarbon revenues could be made available to the Turkish Cypriots even before settlement of the Cyprus problem. Crisis Group interview, April 2022.
35 Non-paper from 13 August 2019, on file with Crisis Group.
36 “Anastasiades proposes creation of escrow account in a bid to ease tension”, op. cit.
38 “Speech of the President of the Republic Mr. Nikos Anastasiades anti-occupation event of Famagusta municipality, at the Famagusta municipal cultural centre in Deryneia”, Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office, 7 August 2021 (Greek).
40 “Turkish Cypriot leader says no point in formal Cyprus talks”, Reuters, 29 April 2021.
41 “Exclusive: Proposal by Anastasiades to Tatar for talks”, Filenews, 30 May 2022 (Greek).
42 TRNC Presidential Statement, Presidency of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 31 May 2022.